VZCZCXRO9451
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0120/01 0461250
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O P 151250Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3080
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0731
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0420
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0011
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3559
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 TRIPOLI 000120
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, S/CT
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/15/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL KISL PTER LY IZ
SUBJECT: EXTREMISM IN EASTERN LIBYA
TRIPOLI 00000120 001.2 OF 004
CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, Dept of
State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1.(C) Summary: A U.S.-Libyan dual national who regularly visits
family members in eastern Libya recently described for us social,
political and economic factors that have contributed to and
facilitated participation by a disproportionately large number
of eastern Libya's native sons in "martyrdom acts" and other
insurgency operations in Libya and Iraq. A reportedly deliberate
GOL policy to keep the east poor as a means by which to limit
the potential political threat to Qadhafi's regime has helped
fuel the perception among many young eastern Libyan men that
they have nothing to lose by participating in extremist violence
at home and in Iraq. The prospect of financial compensation
for their impoverished families motivates some, but local pride
in eastern Libya's historical role as a locus of opposition to
occupying forces of various stripes is also an important factor.
The fact that eastern Libyan mosques are more numerous and
remote, together with tight local social networks, has
reportedly circumscribed the ability of GOL security
organizations to monitor and control the activities of
radical imams as effectively as elsewhere in Libya. Unlike
the rest of the country, sermons in eastern Libyan mosques
are laced with phraseology urging worshippers to support
jihad in Iraq and elsewhere through direct participation
or financial contributions. While senior regime figures,
including Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, appear to have
recognized that the east merits more attention and
investment, the reported ability of radical imams to
propagate messages urging support for and participation
in jihad despite GOL security organizations' efforts
suggests that claims by senior GOL officials that the east
is under control may be overstated. End summary.
2.(S/NF) In a meeting February 5, U.S.-Libyan dual national
xxxxxxxxxxxx(strictly protect) told P/E Chief that eastern
Libya remains a locus of extremist activity over which GOL
security services have comparatively limited control.
GOL KEEPS EAST POOR TO KEEP IT POLITICALLY DISENFRANCHISED ...
3.(S/NF) xxxxxxxxxxxx said eastern Libya suffers from a
disproportionately high level of unemployment, particularly
for young men between the ages of 18 and 34. "At least half"
of the young men in that demographic are unemployed or only
intermittently employed. The situation reflects in part the
Qadhafi regime's belief that if it keeps the east poor enough,
it will be unable to mount any serious political opposition
to the regime. Explaining the rationale, he cited a Libyan
proverb: "If you treat them like dogs, they will follow you
like dogs".
... BUT RECENT VIOLENCE SUGGESTS GOL'S APPROACH FLAWED
4.(S/NF) xxxxxxxxxxxx said recent events in Benghazi and
Derna suggest that the GOL's premise is flawed. Family
members with whom he is in regular contact told him during
his visit that there were violent clashes between local
extremists and GOL elements late last year. In one incident,
extremists opened fire in proximity to a Benghazi hospital
in connection with their attempts to secure medical
assistance for a sick or injured comrade. In another, there
was an explosion or an exchange of gunfire (accounts differed)
at a traffic circle in a Benghazi exurb in connection with
an attempt by a police officer to stop a vehicle being used
by extremists. (Note: Both incidents were reported late last
year in other channels. This is the first mention we've
heard of these events from other sources. End note.)
xxxxxxxxxxxx also offered non-specific accounts of raids by
extremists, whom they understood to be affiliated with the
Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, on police and military
installations to secure weapons.
"NOTHING TO LOSE"
5.(S/NF) Citing conversations with relatives, xxxxxxxxxxxx
said the unemployed, disenfranchised young men of eastern Libya
"have nothing to lose" and are therefore "willing to sacrifice
themselves" for something greater than themselves by engaging
in TRIPOLI 00000120 002.2 OF 004 extremism in the name of
religion. "Their lives mean nothing and they know it, so
they seek to give meaning to their existence through their
deaths", he said. The lack of jobs and dim prospects for
future employment, together with increased costs of living,
mean that many young men lack the means to marry, leaving
them without a key measure of social status and stability
in what remains a traditional society. As in parts of
neighboring Egypt, the average age at which men marry has
increased in many parts of eastern Libya. Many now marry in
their early to mid-30's, which would have been considered
"middle age" in the not too distant past.
COMPENSATION FOR MARTYRS' FAMILIES AN INCENTIVE FOR SOME
6.(S/NF) xxxxxxxxxxxx flatly stated that some young men,
particularly those from more impoverished clans, are motivated
by the promise of long-term financial compensation for their
families should they complete "martyrdom acts" in Iraq or
elsewhere. Noting that incomes in the east are low, he
offered that extremist networks are able to incentivize
young men to kill themselves by offering comparatively small
payments of 150-200 Libyan dinar/month (approximately 120-160
USD/month) to families of "martyrs". (Note: As a point of
reference, most government salaries range from 250 to 330
Libyan dinar per month. End note.)
"PERVERSE PRIDE" AS GEOGRAPHICAL LOCUS OF RESISTANCE A
DRAW FOR OTHERS
7.(S/NF) The fact that the east has been comparatively
disenfranchised, together with its historical role as a
locus of opposition to the Ottoman and Italian occupations,
contribute to a "perverse sense of pride" among eastern
Libyans in their role as a main supplier of young men for
jihad efforts in Iraq and elsewhere, xxxxxxxxxxxx said.
He recounted a large dinner in Derna hosted by a family
friend that he attended in summer 2007. Conversation among
the mostly middle-aged male group of guests focused on news
that two young men from Derna had recently killed themselves
in suicide operations in Iraq. Dinner guests offered a mix
of "condolences and congratulations" to the two young men's
relatives.
8.(S/NF) xxxxxxxxxxxx said he was struck by the level sentiment
against Coalition forces in Iraq, and by the obvious pride
the dinner guests took in the fact that two of their native
sons had "struck a blow" against "occupying Crusader forces
in Iraq". He emphasized that the dinner was one of the
relatively few occasions in Libya in which he felt uncomfortable
by dint of having U.S. citizenship. In xxxxxxxxxxxx view,
eastern Libyans are not necessarily anti-American, but are
strongly opposed to a U.S. military presence in Iraq or
any other Muslim country. In the 1980's, the talk had been
directed against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan; now,
it was focused on the U.S. presence in Iraq.
9.(S/NF) Noting that the leader of Libya's resistance against
the Italian occupation in the early 20th century, national
hero Omar Mukhtar, was from the eastern village of Janzour,
xxxxxxxxxxxx cautioned that it would be a mistake to think
that young men from Derna were motivated to undertake suicide
operations in Iraq solely by unemployment and the chance to
secure a stipend for their families The region had a long,
proud history of opposing occupation forces of one stripe
or another; its residents took pride in their willingness to
"fight for justice and their faith" despite their relative poverty.
IRAQ SEEN AS A "LOCAL" ISSUE FOR YOUNG EASTERN LIBYANS
10.(S/NF) xxxxxxxxxxxx noted that for many young eastern men,
jihad in Iraq was perceived to be a local issue. Among the
factors fueling that perception, he pointed to the proselytizing
influence of Libyan fighters who had fought in Afghanistan
and now recruited young eastern Libyans for operations in
Iraq, the influence of Arabic-language satellite television
broadcasts, use of the Internet to exchange information and
coordinate logistics, and the comparative ease of travel
to/from Iraq. During his last visit to the east, relatives
and friends cited media reports to the effect that Libyans,
most of them from Derna and points east, comprised the
second largest cohort of foreign fighters identified in
documents seized during last September's Objective Massey
operation on the Syria-Iraq border. xxxxxxxxxxxx noted
that a majority of those in Derna who raised the issue
appeared to take pride in the fact that their small city
had contributed disproportionately to the jihad against
coalition forces in Iraq. TRIPOLI 00000120 003.2 OF 004
"CODED" MOSQUE SERMONS MORE RADICAL IN EAST
11.(S/NF) xxxxxxxxxxxx partly attributed the fierce mindset
in Benghazi and Derna to the message preached by imams
in eastern Libyan mosques, which he said is markedly more
radical than that heard in other parts of the country.
xxxxxxxxxxxx makes a point of frequenting mosques whenever
he visits Libya as a means to connect with neighbors and
relatives and take the political pulse. Sermons in eastern
mosques, particularly the Friday 'khutba', are laced with
"coded phrases" urging worshippers to support jihad in
Iraq and elsewhere through direct participation or financial
contributions. The language is often ambiguous enough to
be plausibly denied, he said, but for devout Muslims it
is clear, incendiary and unambiguously supportive of jihad.
Direct and indirect references to "martyrdom operations"
were not uncommon. By contrast with mosques in Tripoli
and elsewhere in the country, where references to jihad
are extremely rare, in Benghazi and Derna they are fairly
frequent subjects.
ARCHITECTURE, GEOGRAPHY COMPLICATE GOL CONTROL OF EASTERN
MOSQUES
12.(S/NF) Part of the difficulty for GOL authorities in
controlling eastern mosques is that the most zealous imams
tend to preach in small suburban and rural mosques.
He mentioned the almost festive atmosphere of one trip,
when relatives gathered to travel to a remote rural mosque
to hear a "controversial" imam's sermon. Unlike Tripoli,
mosques in the east tend to be smaller and more numerous,
making it harder to monitor all of them. Architecture and
local heritage also play a role: many mosques in the east
don't physically resemble traditional mosques elsewhere in
the country, reflecting in part the pseudo-secret tradition
of the Sanussi lodges that evolved in eastern Libya in the
mid-19th century. The fact that many eastern mosques are
less readily identifiable make it harder for GOL security
organizations to identify them and easier to hold unobserved
meetings and sermons, xxxxxxxxxxxx said. He claimed that
it is "widely known" in the east that mosques in town centers
are more closely monitored by GOL security organizations;
however, it has been more difficult for security organizations
to monitor smaller, more remote mosques in exurbs and towns
around Benghazi and Derna.
AS DO TIGHT FAMILY, SOCIAL CIRCLES
13.(S/NF) Citing conversations with relatives, xxxxxxxxxxxx
said it is "common knowledge" that GOL security organizations
attempt to monitor mosque sermons and activities, particularly
Friday 'khutba' sermons. (Note: In Tripoli and other parts
of the country, an officially-sanctioned Friday 'khutba'
theme and talking point-equivalents are distributed to
mosques, often by facsimile. End note.) In addition to
the proliferation of smaller, less visible mosques, the
ability of security organizations to effectively monitor
eastern Libyan mosques is circumscribed by the comparatively
tight social and familial structure. Communities in the east
tend to be smaller and more tightly knit; outsiders are easier
to spot and families "watch out" for members who may have
been turned by GOL security organizations to report on the
activities of their relatives and neighbors.
14.(S/NF) xxxxxxxxxxxx related the story of a young man
from Derna who was recently suspected of reporting to GOL
security organizations on who attended his local mosque and
what was said there. The alleged informant was ostracized by
his fellow worshippers, townsmen and even family members.
After losing his job, reportedly in part because of his
"treachery", he fled to Egypt and has not been heard from
since.
15.(S/NF) Comment: xxxxxxxxxxxx account affords a relatively
rare insider's look at the social, political and economic
factors in eastern Libya that have contributed to and
facilitated participation by a disproportionately large
number of its native sons in "martyrdom acts" and other
insurgency operations in Iraq. Conventional wisdom holds
that the east is poorer and more disenfranchised in part
by deliberate design; however, senior GOL officials have
recently made a point of spending more time and investing
more effort there. Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, the regime's
most public face of political and economic reform, chose
to hold the first and second meetings of his annual Youth
Forum in Benghazi in 2006 and 2007, and gave important
addresses to large crowds there. In the run-up to both events,
he spent considerable time in and around Benghazi, promoting
economic and social development projects under the auspices
of the ostensibly non-governmental Qadhafi Development
Foundation, which he heads. Among them was a billion
dollar-plus "green" project for development of an
environmentally-friendly tourism/business zone TRIPOLI
00000120 004.2 OF 004 adjacent to the Graeco-Roman
ruins at Cyrene, near Benghazi. Work on an extensive
renovation of Benghazi's port, designed to help rejuvenate
shipping volume and create local jobs, also continues.
The most troubling and difficult aspect of xxxxxxxxxxxx's
account is the pride that many eastern Libyans, particularly
those in and around Derna, appear to take in the role their
native sons have played in the insurgency in Iraq. The reported
ability of radical imams to propagate messages urging support
for and participation in jihad despite GOL security
organizations' efforts suggests that claims by senior
GOL officials that the east is under control may be
overstated. End comment.
STEVENS 0 02/15/2008
http://wikileaks.nl/cable/2008/02/08TRIPOLI120.html
